

# The political consequences of immigration in Ireland: some recent survey evidence

Michael Marsh

Professor of Comparative Political Behaviour

Zbisek Zalinski

Research Student

Department of Political Science  
Trinity College Dublin

Paper presented to workshop on Representation, Immigration, and the 2009 Election  
to the European Parliament, University of Indiana at Bloomington, April 1, 2008.

For years Ireland was regarded as a country of emigration. There are an estimated 3 million Irish people living outside Ireland, of whom 1.2 million are Irish-born. Most of them live in the US and the UK. Between 1871 and 1926 net emigration was higher than the natural increase in the population. In the span of one hundred years, between 1861 and 1961 Irish population shrunk from 4.4 million to 2.8 million. Irish history has been punctuated by periods of massive emigration. This was mainly due to the poor state of the country's economy. People were leaving Ireland between 1871 and 1926 (the "age of mass migration") and then again in the decade between 1951 and 1961. The seventies was the first time when the net emigration did not exceed the natural increase in the population, but the following decade brought another period of mass emigration. Between 1988 and 1989 alone, 70,600 people – 2 per cent of the population – left Ireland. The beginning of the 1990s saw the economic situation slowly changing. Ireland was on the cusp of an economic boom, which was to change it completely.

1996 is regarded as the turning point when Ireland slowly ceased to be a country of emigrants and became a country of immigrants. The economy started growing at an unprecedented rate and the numbers of people without employments were falling. The growth rate was more than 8 per cent of the GDP in the late 1990s and the unemployment rate fell from more than 15 per cent in 1993 to less than 8 per cent in 1998. The growth in the economy was also labour-intensive. Between 1991 and 2000 the Irish labour force expanded by 43 per cent with almost half a million new jobs added to the economy. There were significant numbers of Irish-return migrants, with the peak of 27,000 in 2002. Their percentage share of total immigration has been falling, however, from 65 per cent in the late 1980s, to 50 per cent in the 1990s to 42 percent between 2002 and 2003. Non-Irish migrants became a significant part of all the people who decided to make Ireland their home in the second part of the 1990s. During the second half of the 1990s and the beginning of the twenty first century migrants from outside the EU-15 became a very significant part of the total number of immigrants. They constituted 12 per cent of all the immigrants between the years of 1992 and 1995 and 32 per cent in 2002-2003. In five years between 1995 and 2000, approximately quarter of a million people migrated to Ireland. Half of them were returning Irish. This figure is 7 per cent of the Irish population in 1996. If we were to compare these figures with a country like France, it would mean 4 million new migrants. These dramatic changes had a tremendous impact on Irish population. In 1996 6 per cent of the population was foreign born and in 2006 this went up to 14.6 per cent. Looking at the 2006 census, we can see that 10 per cent of the population is of non-Irish nationality (Table 1). To put this into EU-perspective, Ireland – between 1995 and 1999 – had the second highest net migration rate, just after Luxembourg. The fact that between 1990 and 1994 Ireland was the only EU country with a negative migration rate illustrates how dramatic this change was.

The 1990s were not only a time of rapid economic growth and falling unemployment. It was also the time when Ireland had to face a new challenge of asylum seekers. There were 39 asylum applications in Ireland in 1992. In 2002 there were 11, 364

people seeking asylum: Nigeria (34.8 per cent of all applications), Romania (14.4 per cent), Moldova (4.6 per cent), Zimbabwe (3.1 per cent), Ukraine (3.0 per cent) and Poland (2.7 per cent). Since the introduction of government policies aimed at deterring people from applying for asylum in Ireland, the numbers have dropped significantly.

On May 1, 2004, Ireland and the UK were the only countries of the 'old' EU, which opened their job markets to the workers from the 10 new EU countries. The newcomers were: Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Malta, Cyprus, Slovenia and Hungary. This triggered an unprecedented inflow of migrant workers into Ireland that has rapidly altered the make-up of the Irish society. At the end of April 2007 net migration was at 67,300, which accounted for nearly two-thirds of the population increase. 48 per cent of the immigrants were from the 12 new EU countries. Table 2 shows the changes in net migration between 1987 and 2007.

As the number of asylum applications peaked at 11,534 in 2002, Ireland faced a problem of the legal status of non-national parents of children born in Ireland. For years anybody born in Ireland was granted an automatic citizenship and parents of such children had a right to residence in Ireland. In 2003 the Supreme Court ruled that non-national parents of children born in Ireland no longer had the right to residency. In 2004 the government held a referendum in which they suggested to remove a guarantee of citizenship for children born in Ireland. This was accepted with 79 per cent of the vote supporting the change.

Recently a major overhaul of the law surrounding immigration was proposed by the Irish government. At the beginning of 2008 a new version of the Immigration, Residency and Protection bill was published. It met with some strong criticism of NGOs working with refugees and asylum seekers and it was also criticized by the UNHCR. The criticism was directed at the lack of transparency of procedures; the proposed detention at the point of entry to the State; family reunification; banning certain people from the possibility of marrying in Ireland.

The record immigration numbers have changed Ireland and also put some of the services to the test. The over-stretched education system failed in 2007 when an emergency school had to be set-up in Balbriggan, near Dublin, for children of African immigrants, who did not manage to secure places in other schools. This problem was also exacerbated by the fact that in Ireland schools run by the Roman Catholic Church can discriminate pupils on the basis whether or not they were baptised into the faith. Yet there are also signs that Irish immigrant communities are exploiting existing political channels. Rotimi Adebare is the mayor of Portlaoise. He arrived in Dublin in 2000 as an asylum-seeker and is the first black mayor in Ireland. The 2009 local elections will be the first chance for the immigrant communities to take the political initiative and try and win votes.

### **Research question**

Writing about the trends in immigration as long ago as 2003, and reviewing trends in public opinion on immigrants and asylum seekers, O'Connell suggested that there must be a strong expectation that

“right wing populist politics will emerge as an important force in Ireland in the short- to medium term future, perhaps as early as the local and European elections in 2004” (O’Connell 2003: 104)

While fears of economic decline – at least the ending of the boom which had been under way since the mid 1990s – and possible Euro scepticism fuelled by the ending of EU handouts as Ireland would become a net contributor to the budget, the main driving force would be “hostility towards immigrants and refugees in Irish society, intertwined with different forms of racism” (O’Connell 2003: 104). Using a Eurobarometer study from the mid 90s and the Irish social and Political Survey of 2002, O’Connell demonstrates that over the previous five years there was a small increase in the proportion of people declaring themselves to be racist, a big increase in the numbers thinking there were too many people from minorities of a different race and a significant increase in numbers seeing negative consequences for employment, education, social welfare and housing of the increased immigration. The new minorities would provide convenient scapegoats for intractable social and economic problems and some politicians would almost certainly take advantage of the situation for electoral ends. O’Connell went on to argue that there was nothing inevitable about such developments, and pointed to flaws in many arguments that did seem to be overly deterministic (e.g. those of Betz, 1994). Even so, there is at least a prima facie case for expecting some electoral consequences, and perhaps in particular some consequences for perceptions of the EU and how far its policies still made a positive net contribution to Ireland. It is evident that the more extreme right wing parties in Europe do win significant votes on the basis on anti-immigrant (and anti EU) positions (e.g. van der Brug et al 2000), and that almost all countries with any sustained experience of immigration has produced an extreme right party of some electoral significance.

This paper explores some electoral implications of the increase in immigration in recent years, making particular use of the 2002-7 Irish election study, a five-wave panel study conducted between the elections of 2002 and 2007. We ask:

- Is there growing resistance to further immigration?
- Are there signs that anti immigration attitudes underpin opposition to the EU?
- Is any one political party reaping political benefits from anti immigrant sentiment?

As should be clear from the description in the first section, the character of immigration has changed in the last few years, as asylum seekers declined and economic migrants from the new accession states increased. The typical immigrant (if not British) is probably Polish; white, catholic and very well educated. In fact, immigrants are well educated, relative both to the Irish-born population and to immigrant populations elsewhere, with more than one-third possessing a degree, compared with less than one fifth of the native population (Barrett and Bergin 2007: 73, 81). Nor did the slump expected by O’Connell materialise, at least before 2008. In fact, growth returned to high levels after 2003 and contributed to the return of the incumbent FF/PD government in 2007, although this time boosted by the inclusion of the Green Party. To date also no significant movement against immigration exists. The Immigration Control Platform, which has contested recent elections, received a

derisory vote. It has no favoured access to the media and nor is there any section of the media which is significantly hostile to immigration and immigrants.

### **Attitudes to immigration**

The election study included several questions tapping attitudes to immigrants, although most were not repeated in each wave. One constant is the Likert item: "There should be very strict limits on the number of immigrants coming into Ireland". The responses are displayed in Table 3. It is clear that most people agree there should be very strict limits, the implication being there are too many immigrants in Ireland already. Of course, there can be no limits on intra-EU migration, except transitional ones established in accession treaties. Ireland was completely open to migration from the new accession states in 2004, needing the additional labour to maintain economic growth, but was more reserved about migration from Romania and Bulgaria when those countries joined the EU. There are now stronger limits on asylum seekers that there were in 2002, and the referendum on citizenship could also be seen to have tightened controls. There is no sign, however, of any significant increase in those wanting strict limits, or even much of an increase on the strength of feeling on the issue. Arguably, despite the increase in numbers, the tightened controls may have prevented any change in opinion, but it may be more realistic to see public opinion on limits as close to a ceiling and so is unlikely to become even more antagonistic.

It is striking that there are relatively few people who choose to sit on the fence on this issue: almost all people have an opinion in terms of agreeing or disagreeing. This might be taken as evidence that individual opinions on the topic were well formed. The existence of panel data allows us to explore this further. Using Heise's method of calculating reliability of a measure at  $t_3$  ( $r_{12} * r_{23} / r_{13}$ ), the reliability of the immigration measure in 2004 is .67 and in 2006 is .79 and in 2007 is .71 (using consistent samples for those years). This compares well with the figures on abortion, which at just below .80 are the highest for any measure in the panel and probably reflect 30 years of extensive public debate and several referendums. This certainly suggests that people's views on immigration are deeply rooted, and not simply top-of-the-head responses to a survey question.

A question asked in the first and last waves of the panel is focussed more on asylum seekers and deals with the treatment of those who have arrived on Irish shores, and may tap a different dimension of attitudes. The question was another Likert item: Asylum seekers should have the same rights and enjoy the same services as Irish people. Policy has changed here. Until 1999 they were allowed to work, but this policy was changed in 2000, when asylum seekers were dispersed and subject to a direct provision policy, a small cash payment from the State, due to fears that this route would become too attractive and lead to a continued increase in asylum seekers (Allen 2007: 86-7). Indeed, applications levelled out, then declined after 2002. In contrast to the case with limits, public opinion seems more liberal than State policy, but like opinion on limits, has also changed little since 2007. Again, there are few without a clear opinion.

Two further questions focus on the cultural impact of immigration. The first asks if immigrants should be required to adapt to the customs of Ireland and another poses two positions and asks respondents to locate themselves on an 11 point scale whose

extremes are defined by those two positions: Foreign workers and immigrants living in Ireland should preserve their own culture/adjust themselves fully to Irish ways. Figure 1 shows the two distributions, which are not entirely consistent in the picture they give of Irish attitudes, although both measures suggest that proponents of adjustment outweigh those of preservation. The first suggests that 55 percent agree that foreigners should adapt, with about 20 percent sitting on the fence. The second also places about 20 percent on the fence, but opinion is then more evenly divided, with 36 percent for preserving and 44 for adjustment. The two measures – asked very far apart in the survey with the Likert item in the drop-off element – show only a modest correlation at .45 (N=951) that might suggest opinions are less deeply held on this issue. It is of interest to ask what experience leads voters to such positive or negative views: how far do people depend on what they read in the media, as opposed to their own experience. To follow up on this the 2007 study asked about contact with immigrants and the quality of the experience. While only 41 percent had direct contact with immigrants, the overwhelming percentage of them, 84 percent, indicated the experience was positive. Those with contact were also twice as likely to reject strict limits on immigration. This at least suggests that most negative attitudes have their roots elsewhere.

In essence then these data suggest the following:

- No change in support/opposition to immigration, but median voter agrees there is too much
- That opinions on this are also quite stable at the individual level
- No change in views on asylum seekers, but median voter slightly agrees asylum seekers should have same rights as Irish
- Median voter does think immigrants should adjust to Irish culture and practice rather than maintaining their own practices
- Contact with immigrants is associated with more positive feelings towards them

### **Immigration and the EU**

Next we explore whether this growth in immigration has yet any impact on attitudes to the EU, given obvious concerns about the number of immigrants, and the implicit fears about their impact on Irish culture. While the defeat of the referendum on the Nice Treaty in 2001 raised doubts about Ireland's continued enthusiasm for the EU, this data shown in Table 4 suggest despite Ireland's approval on Nice on the second occasion, there is significant resistance to further integration. There is clearly a significant group firmly opposed to EU membership – the largest group each wave apart from those in the centre – but generally opinion is fairly evenly divided on the need for more/less integration. Support for the EU seems to have dropped to a temporary low in 2003, but remained stable from 2004 onwards. However, there is much greater instability at individual level, reliability being only .32 in 2004, .38 in 2006 and .26 in 2007, significantly lower than for any other measure obtained in all five waves. It is worth making it clear that Irish people in general consider

membership of the EU has been a “good thing” as opposed to a “bad thing”: 81 percent in 2002 and 77 percent in 2007.<sup>1</sup>

How do attitudes to immigration map on to those about the EU, and to what extent has that changed in the 2002-7 period? We examine that in a very simple way in Figure 2, graphing the correlation between views on the EU and views on immigration limits in each wave. There is some sign of an increase between 2002 and 2006 with correlations almost double in 2004 and 2006 what they are in 2002-3, but in 2007 the association fell back towards the 2002 level and further tests suggested this apparent trend is not strong enough to be statistically significant. The link between the benefits of the EU and immigration does suggest a statistically significant trend although we only have data from 2002 and 2007 on that EU variable.

### **Immigration and party choice**

Immigration has typically not been an issue of much debate in Irish elections. Only 8 /1435 respondents to the 2007 wave of the election study mentioned immigration explicitly as the most important issue for them personally. Occasions such as one in Cork in 2002 when a FF deputy made several derogatory statements about asylum seekers and was called to explain himself to the party leader (but not sanctioned, and increased his vote) are rare. On another occasion, much was made of remarks by the Labour Party’s leader in 2006 who raised questions about foreign workers depressing wages, a remark explained as supporting Union demands for much better regulation of exploitative employers. But both instances are notable by their relatively exceptional nature. In general it must be said that none of the established parties has done much to try to mobilise votes on the bases of concerns about the changing Irish population. Table 5 shows the relationship between views on limiting immigration and vote choice, combining all waves of the election study to give a larger N for some of the smaller parties. It does indicate a link between vote and attitudes, although not a strong one. Those clearly disagreeing with limits are at least twice as likely to vote Labour or Green than those who clearly agree with limits. In contrast, those who disagree are only half as likely to vote Fianna Fail as those who agree. It seems to be the left of centre parties who do better at mobilising the (relatively) small liberal vote in this respect and the centre right parties do better among those who want tighter limits, but SF is an exception here, showing no clear differences across attitude groups. SF is also the least middle class of the leftist parties, and FF the most working class of the right wing parties.

Is there any sign that this link between party and attitude to immigration is changing? A logit regression estimation of left voting on immigration and wave, with an interaction term, confirmed the clear association with attitudes to immigration, but did not sustain any trend towards a stronger link across the five waves. An alternative

---

<sup>1</sup> Another question asked in 2002 and 2007 also reinforced the picture of Irish people as more supportive of the EU, but indicates a significant change since 2002. This is the question asked in recent EES surveys: European unification has already gone too far/ European unification should be pushed further. In 2002 54 percent thought unification should be pushed further, but only 37 percent did so in 2007, with 33 percent saying it had gone too far. Of course with 27 members the EU is much larger than it was in 2002, and this change may reflect that.

approach, calculating Cramer's V for the association between vote and immigration for each wave certainly indicates no upward trend: associations are .19, .13, .15, .15 and .14 respectively across the five waves. Moreover, for the EP election in 2004 the association is only .12.

Much the same conclusions can be drawn using an alternative attitude measure, that tapping whether or not immigrants should adjust or preserve their cultures. Again we see a pattern whereby the left parties win more votes among those with more liberal views, although the really dramatic effect is confined to the 4 percent who strongly disagree that immigrants should adjust. Again there is no sign of any trend: Cramer's V indicating the link with party choice is respectively .10, .13, .14, .10 and .11.

### **The EU, Immigration and representation**

In this last section we will look at the link between the views of voters and parties on immigration, taking as our measure of party views the opinions of each party's candidates in 2007 and comparing this with the responses of voters in 2007 to the same questions. Enough has been said already to suggest that the parties do not have very different views on these issues, and we should not be surprised if they therefore do not choose to send out very different messages to their voters. In a postal survey which obtained above a 40 percent response rate from the 450+ candidates in 2007, candidates were asked to agree/disagree with the following statement: Immigrants should be required to adapt to the customs of Ireland. Responses can be contrasted to the question asked of voters discussed above: that immigrants should be required to the customs of Ireland. Responses are averaged by party for each group. What we see in Figure 3 is not surprising: while there are some differences between candidates by party, with those on the centre left broadly more liberal than those representing parties on the centre right, there is much less difference among voters by party, where the left-right gradient is very slight. Asked if immigrants were good for the Irish economy fully 86 percent of candidates agreed with only 4 percent, all independents, disagreeing.

### **Discussion**

The last ten years in Ireland has brought two novel experiences: sustained rapid economic growth and considerable net migration, with significant numbers of the population now originating from outside the British Isles. The State has responded to immigration in two ways: by opting not to introduce barriers to migration from within the EU while at the same time acting to tighten control over access to those from outside, with current plans for legislation to increase control still further. Of course immigration was fuelled by unprecedented economic growth, which apart from a downward post 9/11 blip in 2002-3, has been sustained for more than a decade. That now seems over, with most forecasters predicting little growth in the near future and at best 'normal' levels in the years that follow.



Given the European experience where inward migration has seemed to serve as a catalyst for the significant electoral growth of extreme right parties, the consequences of inward migration in Ireland obviously deserves academic attention and there is a growing Irish literature examining the economic, social and possible political consequences. This paper has contributed to that by exploring some change in public opinion and the links between opinion and electoral behaviour over the last five years. The five years previous to 2002 do seem to have shown the growth of a greater intolerance in Irish attitudes to immigrants and other minorities, leading to predictions that further growth, or even the existence of a now sizable immigrant population could have significant electoral implications. There are also possible implications for Irish support of European integration.

Our data certainly sustain a picture of a society wary of high levels of inward migration, with most voters clear that there are insufficient controls, and a majority also feeling that foreign workers need to adapt to Irish customs rather than sustain their own culture. Attitudes to immigration also seem quite stable at the level of individuals. However, there is no evidence of any growing connection between concerns about immigration and reported voting behaviour; nor is there any firm sign of a growing link between such attitudes and views on Europe, although there are slight indications of such a trend. Certainly there are differences in views between the elites of the various parties, but as in so many areas of Irish politics, these differences are reflected much less clearly in the electorate supporting each of those parties (Marsh et al 2008 ch 3).

Why is there so little impact? One possible reason lies in the character of much immigration, which is predominantly from the US, the UK and the new accession countries and so less visible than it has been elsewhere. A second is that the Irish government has been determined to demonstrate that it would not allow the country to become a soft target for migrants from outside the EU, as evidenced by the much tighter controls on asylum seekers and the referendum on nationality. Whether the reality justified the action is beside the point: the signal was given, and proposals for new legislation seem designed to continue that stance. To this degree, FF in particular as the dominant party of the centre right did not make it easy to any rival to emerge to its right on that issue (see Kitschelt 1996). Another argument, advanced most clearly by O'Malley (forthcoming) is that the natural home for anti immigrant sentiment would be the largely working class, largely male-supported nationalist (and anti-EU) SF party, but that party's own rights-based ideological outlook, formed in the conflict within NI, is hardly consistent with an anti immigrant stance. However, the expectation that such parties must have such socio-economic foundations is also problematic (van der Brug et al 2005). It may still be much too early to suggest immigration will have no electoral impact, apart from the appearance of immigrant politicians within the existing Irish parties. Any prolonged economic downturn will almost certainly lead to a growth in unemployment unless there is a significant labour outflow that may heighten latent tensions. A final point is that perhaps Irish political institutions do not lend themselves easily to clear issue based, let alone ideologically based conflicts. The recipe for success has been a consensual outlook combined with close attention to parochial interests. Any extreme right party would have to break the mould.

References

- Allen, K. 2007. 'Neo-liberalism and immigration', in Bryan Fanning editor *Immigration and social change in the Republic of Ireland*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 84-112.
- Barrett, A. and A. Bergin 2007. 'The economic contribution of immigrants in Ireland' in Bryan Fanning (editor) *Immigration and social change in the Republic of Ireland*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 63-83.
- Betz, H. 1996. *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*. NY: St Martin's Press.
- van der Brug, W., M. Fennema and J. Tillie 2000. 'Anti-immigrant parties in Europe: Ideological or protest vote?' *European Journal of Political Research* 37: 77-102.
- van der Brug, W., M. Fennema and J. Tillie 2005. 'Why Some Anti-Immigrant Parties Fail and Others Succeed', *Comparative Political Studies* 38: 537-73.
- Kitschelt, H. 1995. *The radical right in Western Europe. A comparative analysis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Marsh, M., R. Sinnott, J. Garry and F. Kennedy 2008. *The Irish voter*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- O'Connell, M. 2003. *Right-Wing Ireland? The Rise of Populism in Ireland and Europe*. Dublin: Liffey Press.
- O'Malley, E. forthcoming. 'Why is there no extreme right party in Ireland?' *West European Politics*.

**Table 1: Usual residents, by place of birth. 2002-2006.**

Place of residence	2002	2006
Ireland	89.6	85.3
Outside Ireland (Republic)		
EU 25	7.5	10.5
Northern Ireland	1.3	1.2
Great Britain	5.1	5.3
Poland	-	1.5
Lithuania	-	0.6
Other EU 25	1.0	1.9
USA	0.6	0.6
Other	2.3	3.6
Total	100.0	100.0

**Table 2: Annual population change 1987 – 2007\* (preliminary)**

Source: CSO

Year ending April	Immigrants	Emigrants	Net migration	Population change (000s)
1987	17.2	40.2	-23.0	5.9
1988	19.2	61.1	-41.9	-15.8
1989	26.7	70.6	-43.9	-21.2
1990	33.3	56.3	-22.9	-3.7
1991	33.3	35.3	-2.0	19.9
1992	40.7	33.4	7.4	28.8
1993	34.7	35.1	-0.4	19.6
1994	30.1	34.8	-4.7	11.8
1995	31.2	33.1	-1.9	15.4
1996	39.2	31.2	8.0	24.8
1997	44.5	25.3	19.2	38.2
1998	46.0	28.6	17.4	38.8
1999	48.9	31.5	17.3	38.5
2000	52.6	26.6	26.0	47.9
2001	59.0	26.2	32.8	57.7
2002	66.9	25.6	41.3	70.0
2003	60.0	29.3	30.7	62.6
2004	58.5	26.5	32.0	65.3
2005	84.6	29.4	55.1	88.6
2006	107.8	36.0	71.8	106.0
2007*	109.5	42.2	67.3	106.1

**Table 3 There should be very strict limits on the number of immigrants coming into Ireland**

	2002	2003	2004	2006	2007	Total
Disagree strongly	2	5	4	5	1	3
Disagree	17	9	7	15	12	12
Disagree slightly	5	7	8	6	6	7
Neither	5	6	7	5	5	5
Agree slightly	12	15	18	17	21	16
Agree	40	24	26	24	35	30
Agree strongly	18	35	29	28	20	26
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
No limits	24	21	20	26	19	22
Limits	71	73	74	69	76	72

Irish election study 2002-7: constant sample. N=415

**Table 4 Asylum seekers should have the same rights and services as Irish people**

	2002	2007	Total
Disagree strongly	6	9	7
Disagree	21	19	20
Disagree slightly	9	12	10
Neither	6	7	7
Agree slightly	11	18	14
Agree	42	33	38
Agree strongly	5	3	4
Total	100	100	100
Same rights	57	54	56
Not the same rights	36	39	38

Irish election study 2002-7: constant sample. N=1064

**Table 5 Ireland should do all it can to unite fully with the European Union / Ireland should do all it can to protect our independence from the European Union**

	2002	2003	2004	2006	2007	Total
Unite with EU	8	9	5	14	9	9
_1	8	6	8	4	6	7
_2	9	6	8	8	9	8
_3	8	9	10	8	7	8
_4	6	4	7	5	7	6
_5	22	14	20	17	21	19
_6	8	8	8	8	7	8
_7	8	7	6	7	11	8
_8	8	11	9	8	11	9
_9	5	3	4	2	4	4
Independent of EU	8	23	15	19	9	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Closer	40	35	38	39	38	38
Not so close	38	51	42	45	42	42

Irish election study 2002-7: constant sample. N=478. Don't know answers excluded.

**Table 6 Relationship between opinion on limiting immigration and party choice 2002-7**

	Disagree strongly	Disagree	Slightly	Neither	Slightly	Agree	Agree strongly	Total
FF	24	23	37	28	28	38	37	33
FG	23	20	18	26	24	25	26	24
PD	3	2	2	3	7	6	4	4
Ind	5	7	5	4	5	7	7	6
Other	1	2	1	0	0	1	2	1
Green	10	7	6	9	9	4	3	5
Lab	19	27	21	13	16	10	11	15
SF	6	5	4	5	4	3	7	5
Non voters	8	7	7	11	7	6	4	6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Left	36	39	31	27	29	17	21	25
Right	50	45	57	57	58	69	66	62

Irish election study 2002-7 combined waves.



**Table 7 Relationship between opinion on requirement that immigrants adjust to Irish customs and party choice 2002-7**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
FF	9	36	39	35	38	36
FG	21	25	25	27	28	26
PD	0	3	5	6	3	5
Ind	9	5	5	8	10	7
Other	0	1	1	0	2	1
Green	6	7	6	4	3	5
Lab	43	21	17	13	13	16
SF	11	3	3	7	3	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Right	30	64	68	68	69	66
Left	60	31	26	24	18	26

Irish election study 2002-7 combined waves.




Figure 1 Two questions on immigration 2007




Figure 2 Correlation between views on immigration and on the EU 2002-7




Figure 3 Views on immigration: party candidates and party voters 2007